age support system, 5 the sex ratio and physical safety of females, 6 and the psychological health of only children. 7 Still others decried the violation of human rights that occurred in the course of enforcing a policy so at odds with the desires of the vast majority of the Chinese people. 8 Concern about reports of coercive abortion and involuntary sterilization led the American Government to reduce funds for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 1985, and to withdraw support completely in fiscal years 1986-89. 9 Ironically, this barrage of criticism has made it harder to obtain the information necessary to assess these claims, and, more broadly, to understand how the one-child policy has evolved during the past decade. Two ministers-in-charge of the State Family Planning Commission have been removed in the past five years, 10 inducing current leaders of the Commission to exercise great caution when discussing policy matters. Caught between the top leadership's demands that fertility not rise out of control, and foreign critics' demands that the policy be liberalized, official spokesmen have learned to speak with two voices, reporting in China Daily that population policy has been relaxed, while announcing in Renmin ribao that the population situation remains "grim" and population policy is being "tightened up."
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The separation of rhetoric from reality has thus become more difficult even as a clear understanding of China's population policy has grown more important. Internally, how the one-child policy has evolved has macroeconomic and demographic implications for the speed and success of China's modernization effort, as well as microsocial and psychological consequences for family organization and the personality configuration of the next generation. Externally, the assessment of how China's population policy has changed affects not only the lessons China contains for other Third World countries in the design of population policy and family planning programmes, but also, and more importantly, its record on human rights and its ability to deflect or otherwise manage what it sees as interference in its internal affairs as it opens its doors to foreign assistance.
The Cycles-ofcoercion Model. Some analysts have depicted the process of population policy evolution as one of oscillation between use of more and less coercive methods, with no long-run learning by policy-makers about the optimal means for achieving their fertility ends. 11 In this view, most vigorously espoused by Aird, but evident also in the work of Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, China's fertility policy has followed a cyclical pattern in which demands for fertility control intensified in I 979, moderated in I 980 and early I 98 I, hardened again between late I 98 I and I 983, softened slightly from I 984 to 1986, only to tighten again in I 987, 1988 and early I 989. 1n this analysis the political centre enforces its unpopular fertility policy largely by pressuring local cadres to coerce the masses. Pressure continues until public opposition is too strong to ignore, at which point the leadership relaxes its pressure on the cadres. The loosening of controls leads to an upsurge in births, provoking new fears of excessive population growth, and another wave of pressure courses through the political system. This process is then repeated, locking the country into an inexorable cycle of coercive drives. This cyclical "model" of population policy is not a 1980s version of the osciUatory models of Chinese policy that were developed and 11. The oscillatory image is most clearly articulated in Aird, "Coercion. debated by China scholars in the 1960s and l 970s. 12 Reminiscent of early post-war totalitarian models of the Soviet Union, the current version is unencumbered by the explicit assumptions about policy interdependence, partial policy dualism, and so forth , that made the more scholarly versions of sinologists useful heuristic devices.
A cyclical image of Chinese population policy is not without some merits. The notion of an alternation between intensification and relaxation of policy initiatives captures part of the dynamic of totalitarian systems in a simple image readily understood by a wide audience. The focus on coercion is also helpful where the aim is to evaluate Chinese policy in terms of American values and to draw implications for U.S. foreign policy.
However, the particular cyclical model that Aird posits has serious deficiencies that reduce its usefulness as a basis both for understanding Chinese population policy and for formulating American policy towards China's planned birth programme. First, Aird's preoccupation with coercion precludes an adequate analysis of changes in the mix of implementation methods that have been employed and of linear patterns of change that might indicate a process of learning by policy-makers. Secondly, the assumption that virtually all policy flows from the top to the bottom of the politicaE system blinds him to the possibility that localities might exercise substantial autonomy in devising local fertility policies. Finally, Aird's failure to model features of the Chinese system that might sustain or undermine a cyclical pattern produces a static picture of policy evolution that meshes poorly with what we know about change in other sectors of Chinese social and economic policy.
As a bridge to constructing a sounder account, I briefly examine the deficiencies in the cycles-of-coercion model at three levels: meansend relations within population policy itself; centre-locality relations within the political system as a whole; and the changing relation of population policy and the political system generating it to their economic and social environment.
Towards an Improved Model of Population Policy Evolution. MEANS-END RELATIONS.
An important issue obscured by the cyclesof-coercion model is what kinds of policy instruments ought to work best in achieving the goal of fertility reduction. In Etzioni's classic formulation, for each major type of policy goal-ideological, economic, and order -one type of means is particularly effective. Ideological goals are most readily achieved through the application of normative power, economic goals through the use of remunerative means, and order goals through the use of coercive measures.
What kind of goal is fertility reduction? The answer, I believe, hinges on the level of fertility reduction sought and the time frame within which the goal is to be achieved. The comparative demographic literature suggests that long-term fertility reduction to replacement level (roughly two children per couple) may best be conceptualized as a combination economic-ideological goal that can most efficiently be achieved by changing the economic incentives for childbearing and modifying the values attached to having children. If a regime is intent on achieving rapid fertility reduction in a given socio-economic climate, such as that of rural China, in which economic incentives favour moderate or high fertility and values are pro-natalist, then the goal should probably be conceived of as an order goal, in which the aim is to prevent people from doing what policymakers consider the wrong thing (in this case, having several children). This is all the more true if the aim is to achieve rapid fertility reduction to a level below two children per couple. Coercive measures are probably the only tools available to policy-makers to achieve this kind of goal.
What kind of goal drives the one-child policy? Aird's analysis would suggest that since its inception the policy's goal has been an order goal. Taking official pronouncements at face value, he has consistently maintained that the policy's goal is that set forth in the 1980 Open Letter: keeping population size under l · 2 billion in the year 2000 by encouragiing all couples to have only one child. However, evidence reviewed in the paper's conclusion indicates that the numerical goals stated in the Open Letter have been relaxed in subtle but important ways since at least 1984. Furthermore, interviews I conducted with Chinese policy-makers and their scholarly advisers in 1985-87 and 1989 indicate that, at least since the mid 1980s, a deliberate gap has existed between the declared goal and the actual goal. 14 Believing that couples will always try to have more children than they are allowed -two if allowed one, three if allowed two -leaders have announced unrealistically low fertility and population size targets in hopes of achieving something better. At the present state of our knowledge, the most informed assessment may be that from 1979 to 1983 the goal of the one-child policy most closely resembled an order goal, best pursued through the application of coercive measures. Since around 1984, however, the objective of the one-child policy has more closely resembled an economic-ideological goal. The actual (as opposed to the stated) goal of policy-makers -interviews with many individuals suggest a vague, satisficing formulation of the sort "keeping fertility and population size levels as low as possible" is best 14 . Interview file 8511 bj, 86 I 2xa, 871 Obj, 8906tn.
achieved through the application of economic and normative measures to alter the environment in which childbearing decisions are made.
If the goal of the one-child policy has changed, have the methods employed to achieve the goal also changed? In other words, have China's leaders learned Etzioni's lesson about the relative efficacy of different means in achieving different objectives? ·Because of its restrictive assumptions, the demographers' cyclical model precludes an exploration of these questions. Assuming there is no linear change in methods, only oscillation between more and less coercive means, the cyclical model implies that there is no learning about which mix of normative, remunerative and coercive methods works best; in this view, the only important learning that occurs concerns the level of coercion the population can tolerate. Because it assumes away the very questions that need to be examined-the extent of learning by policy-makers, and the direction, cyclical or linear, of overall policy change -the cyclical model is a poor guide to understanding the evolution of China's population policy.
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CENTRE-LOCALITY RELATIONS. The cyclical view of population policy assumes a top-down model of the policy-making process in which the centre dictates policy to the provinces and provinces dictate policy to the localities. Put succinctly by Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister:
China's family planning program [is] one whose regulations and guidelines are decided at the national level and dictated to provincial and lower levels of government and ultimately to couples of childbearing age, with only small variations allowed. 16 Underlying this view of the policy-making process one can discern a totalitarian model of the Chinese polity, one in which power is highly concentrated at the political centre, and in which the centre is capable of both monitoring and controlling events in the provinces.
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These notions contrast sharply with the views of other students of the Chinese political system. With regard to the centralization of power, the view of China's state as a totalitarian, coercive institution was widely accepted by western analysts in the 19 50s and early l 960s, 15. Hint:s of answers to these questions can be found in H. Yuan Tien, "Second thoughts on the second child: a talk with Peng Peiyun," Population Today, Vol. 17, No. 4 ( 1989), pp. 6-9; Tyrene White, " Implementing the 'one-child-per-couple' population program in rural China: national goals and local politics," in David M. Lampton but fell out of favour in the late 1960s and I 970s. 18 In the rural areas, a growing literature argues that throughout the post-1949 period the " reach of the state" has been shorter than totalitarian models suggest. 19 With regard to the policy process, research in the 1970s and 1980s has highlighted the fragmented, cellular nature of the Chinese policymaking apparatus. 20 In a wide range of policy sectors-water management, 21 agriculture, 22 prices, 23 and investment, 24 to name a few -local adaptation and distortion of central policies has been a basic feature of the Chinese political system. 25 Local autonomy in policy-making is of two sorts, that intended and not intended by the central leadership. Intentional local autonomy is deliberately conferred by the centre through the application of the "mass line," whereby the centre stipulates only general policy guidelines, expecting lower levels to devise specific policy in accord with local conditions. Unintentional local autonomy is simply grabbed by subnational policy-makers, who subvert the goals of national leaders through nonimplementation or partial implementation of central policies. Unless one assumes that population policy remains somehow immune to the forces shaping the political system as a whole, these findings challenge the claim that population policy is dictated to the provinces and localities by the centre.
RELATIONS BETWEEN POLICY CONTEXT AND CONTENT.
The cyclesof-coercion model underestimates the importance of the larger environment in which the one-child policy has been introduced. The analytic issue is whether and how changes in the context of population policy implementation have altered its content, style of implementation, and perhaps even its goals. 26 Aird is largely oblivious to socioeconomic context, focusing almost exclusively on changes in policy content in response to mass resistance to coercive methods. HardeeCleaveland and Banister recognize the impact of rural socio-economic reforms on the one-child policy, but see it as relatively superficial. In their view, every threat posed by the economic reforms has been countered by a new coercive device for enforcing the one-child policy, with the result that "during the 1980s, the essential nature of China's family planning program has not changed. " 27 The conclusion that population policy has remained relatively impervious to reform-induced changes is at odds with the results of research in other policy sectors. In large pockets of the economy and polity the post-1978 reforms have brought a liberalization of policy goals and content, and a self-conscious shift of implementation methods away from the coercive campaign strategies of the Maoist era towards indirect, rationalistic methods. 28 In another area of demographic policy-migration -authorities appear to have lost control over the population. 29 The notion that reproduction remains so isolated from other areas of life that it alone is subject to heavyhanded control stretches the political imagination. A process of growing -though still very limited-freedom in reproductive matters would better fit our notions of how policies in different realms interact and socio-political change occurs. 30 SOURCES. The disjunction between the views of demographers such as Aird and other students of contemporary China may stem in part from different ideological predispositions. At least as important, however, is the difference in the data sources on which their assessments are based. It is a central contention of this article that these demographers' near-exclusive reliance on secondhand materials 26 -in particular, translations of Chinese broadcasts and newspaper and journal articles supplied by such services as FBIS and JPRS 31 -has given them a biased and partial view of the process of policy formulation and implementation. Of course, if their politicized nature is properly understood, these materials form a crucial source of information. The point here is that unless the published Chinese sources are supplemented by interview, observational, and original documentary data, the resulting picture will be incomplete and biased in predictable ways.
The most critical source of bias lies in the fact that key policy decisions are often not reported in the government-controlled press. Consistently excluded from press coverage are decisions to liberalize population policy. This makes obvious political sense: news of policy relaxation is kept confidential because China's leaders believe its release would spark a baby boom. 32 Significantly, neither the 1984 decisions to "open a small hole," nor the 1988 decision to extend country-wide the policy allowing peasants with one daughter to have another child was directly reported to the Chinese people.
Distortion also results from the concentration of the Chinese media on positive and negative models, to the neglect of middle-of-the-road cases. In the area of birth planning, it is primarily localities responding with alacrity to policy initiatives or gaining infamy from the existence of serious abuses that are reported in the press. 33 Clearly, reliance on these sources results in a distorted picture of birth planning practice in China.
Exclusive reliance on the Chinese media also results in an incomplete picture of population policy formulation and implementation. Because one has no control over what is translated, what one obtains is a smattering of information from different times and places, a weak foundation on which to infer trends in policy content and implementation nation-wide. Information on subprovincial policies is rare at best, leaving a gap in the analyst's understanding of the content and role of local policy. More damaging still, the birth planning regulations, clearly the heart of the birth policy, are rarely published in full; even when one set of regulations is available, the other sets needed to make cross-temporal comparisons generally are not. 34. Lacking the regulations, Aird is forced to rely on a variety of other, largely indirect types ofevidence-e.g., the "toughness" oflanguage used in speeches-to infer policy change. Most of this evidence is problematic, marred by well-known problems of incompleteness of coverage, political restrictions on public discourse, and falsification of statistics.
OBJECTIVES. This article explores the evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi from its adoption in 1979 through 1988. The primary materials used include information on the major regulations on birth planning issued by Shaanxi province, and the major documents (including regulations and other documents) issued by Xianyang city and a township (formerly commune) within its borders. The analysis also draws on some documents from a village (formerly brigade) within the township, but the materials on this level may not be complete.
The data were gathered as part of a collaborative field research project undertaken by the Population Council and Xi'an Jiaotong University's Population Research Institute during the first six months of 1988. The information used here was obtained through interviews with local birth planning cadres and 150 family heads, as well as documentary research in local newspapers, journals and other sources. Local cadres were unaware of the international controversy over China's birth programme and, judging from their comments, did not censor their views for this foreign researcher.
My primary objective is to assess the validity of the oscillatory model of population policy in light of the policy process in Shaanxi. Three questions are of central concern. First, how has the means-ends relationship within population policy changed, and to what extent has the overall direction of learning been linear as opposed to cyclical? Secondly, how has the balance of power between centre and locality developed with regard to decisions on the content and timing of innovations in local birth planning policy? Finally, to what extent have changes in the economic and social environment shaped fertility policy?
The Policy Context: Demographic and Economic Change in Shaanxi
During the first four decades after the founding of the People's Republic, fertility levels in Shaanxi, an overwhelmingly Han Chinese province, were close to the country-wide average, diverging only slightly during the Great Leap Forward (see Table l ). 35 Following the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979 the country-wide total fertility rate fluctuated, falling to a low of 2 · 2 in 198 5 before rising to 2·6 in 1987, just below the level of 2·75 achieved under the previous later-longer-fewer (wanxishao) policy in 1978. Total fertility rates in Shaanxi followed a similar pattern, but rose in 1987 to a level above that attained in 1978. Given the widespread under-reporting of births, both in Shaanxi and elsewhere, conclusions about fertility levels in the 35 . During the Great Leap a crisis of only moderate proportion produced fluctuations in birth rates that were less sharp than those recorded elsewhere.
1980s should be regarded as provisional. 36 The details may be open to debate, but there is little disagreement that the one-child policy has not been a stunning demographic success.
With population growth rates hovering around the average, Shaanxi's total population has remained a stable 2·7-2·9 per cent of the national total since the early 1950s. At the end of 1978 the provincial population stood at 27·8 million; by the end of 1988, 3·6 million more mouths had been added, bringing the total to 31-4 million.
Located just west of Xi'an City in the Guanzhong Plain, in 1986 Xianyang city was home to 3·97 million people, or about 13 per cent of the province's total. 37 In the same year its crude birth rate and rate of natural population growth were 16·4 and 11·7, a shade off the provincial averages of 17 ·O and 11·3, respectively. 38 Shaanxi was somewhat late in introducing the post-1978 agricultural reforms, but the changes initiated were similar to those promoted elsewhere. 39 Beginning in 1979 private plots were returned to individual peasant management and, where appropriate, enlarged.
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Restrictions on sideline enterprises and use of periodic markets were lifted, and diversified management was encouraged. Specialized households developed, although at a slower pace than elsewhere. 41 Production responsibility systems first appeared in Shaanxi in 1980 and had become widespread by 1981. 42 By the end of 1983, 99·7 per cent of the former production teams had implemented household contracting responsibility systems, of which 99 per cent were comprehensive contract (dabaogan) systems. 43 Collectives also relin- 63-64. The Shaanxi Provincial Birth Planning Commission has noted that statistics on births are "seriously incorrect," a fact which has "covered up the facts," but it has released no information on the extent of the undercount. Jing Xianfeng, "Shaanxi provincial government issues warning to leaders at all levels on the partial loss of population control," Renmin ribao, 20 These reforms profoundly altered the context in which the onechild policy was to be implemented. The transfer of land to peasant family management increased the labour value of children, especially sons, among the 82 per cent of the province's population in the agricultural sector. 45 Rural per capita incomes more than doubled between l 980 and 1987 (see Table 2 ), enabling peasants to pay the fines for having unauthorized children without suffering undue hardship. At the same time, however, the rate of economic improvement in rural Shaanxi remained well below the national average, forestalling modernizing trends that might have induced lower childbearing desires. In 1986 the net per capita income of peasants in Shaanxi was only 71 per cent of the China-wide average, and the proportion of households owning such consumer goods as bicycles, watches and televisions remained significantly below the countrywide average (Table 2) .
The abolition of unified team accounting dealt a severe blow to the system of economic incentives and disincentives by which the one-child policy was to be enforced. No longer could cadres directly deduct contributions to the welfare fund (from which the one-child benefits were paid) or exact penalties for unauthorized childbearing from a peasant household's portion of the collective income. The task became one of persuading peasants to hand over contributions and fees, a near-impossible assignment given the widespread feeling that the limitations on births exceeded the bounds of reason. 46 Commune reform exacerbated enforcement problems by reducing the power and prestige of brigade and team cadres, including those charged with birth planning work. Furthermore, by including these cadres in the redistribution of land, the reforms turned them into self-employed cultivators, increasing theiir identification with the peasants and further weakening their motivation to strictly enforce the policies on childbearing. 47 We turn now to the birth planning regulations, to see bow the policy was adapted to meet these challenges. 45 . Bas.ed on family histories gathered from 150 family heads. The pro-natalist effects of the reforms elsewhere are described by Elisabeth Croll, "Some implications of the rural reforms for the Chinese peasant household," in Ashwani Saith (ed. 46. Bas.ed on interviews with present and former cadres in the Xianyaog township where I carried out research. Birth planning cadres there were loath to demand excesscbild penalties from fellow villagers, preferring instead to pay a fine for not meeting their quota of penalties collected.
47. In the Xianyang township studied, local cadres spent their days in the fields, squeezing home visits associated with birth planning into the evening hours. Nor were they inclined to enforce the rules too strictly, often bending them for family and friends.
On the decline in cadre power in the wake of the economic reforms generally, see Richard J. Latham, "The implications of rural reforms for grassroots cadres," in Perry and Wong (eds.), Poitical Economy, pp. 157-73 and Gordon White, "Riding the tiger: Grass-roots rural politics in the wake of the Chinese economic reforms," in Saith (ed.), Re-emergence, pp. 250-69.
Overview of Birth Planning Regulations
In Shaanxi birth planning guidelines began to be systematically formalized in written documents only after the one-child policy was announced in January 1979.
48 Beginning in May 1979 birth planning regulations have been issued by four levels of the administrative system in the hierarchy of localities studied: province, municipality, township (formerly commune) and village (formerly brigade). Table 3 shows the policy documents included in the analysis by year and month issued, as well as policy developments at the national level that are demonstrably related to policy changes in Shaanxi. On the provincial, city and township levels, documents were issued at four points in time; if policy change was oscillatory, a maximum of l ! cycles (e.g., tightening-loosening-tightening) could be observed at each level.
Provincial Regulations. At the provincial level the first document issued was the "Trial Regulations" in June 1979. Shaanxi was among the first provinces to respond to the leadership's call to draw up regulations promoting the slogan "one is best, don't exceed two," 4 9 following Anhui, apparently the first, by only one month. so Careful comparison of the contents of the 1979 Trial Regulations with the provisions of regulations issued from 1981 on suggests that, in Shaanxi and other provinces that formally adopted the one-child rule late, the period 1979-80 should be regarded as a transitional phase between the later-longer-fewer policy era (1971-79)5 1 and the fullfledged or "mature" one-child policy period.
Only months after the Trial Regulations were issued, the central leadership began to advocate that each couple have only one child. In early 1980 the Provincial Birth Planning Leadership Small Group commenced drafting a set of supplementary regulations reflecting this demand, while a number of prefectures and municipalities devised their own local policies that followed national directives. It was only in May 1981, after a year of discussion of the draft, review of the regulations of other provinces, and revisions to incorporate the essentials of the Central Committee's Open Letter and the 1980 48. The first written documents on birth planning in Shaanxi were the "Methods of mana,ging expenses and expenditures for birth pEanning work in Shaanxi Province," enacted in December 1962. As elsewhere, birth planning was interrupted during the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1973 a number of prefectures and cities (not including Xianyang, then a prefecture) adopted regulations encouraging two-child families and undoing previous rules that had rewarded ""' 2.. Marriage Law, that the leadership introduced the "Temporary Regulations," which attempted to " unify the calibre" of the rules promotiing one-child families province-wide. 52 To these were added the "Supplementary Regulations" in October 1982, which elaborated new methods of implementing the policy in areas where production responsibility systems had been introduced.
Four years later, in July 1986, the leadership issued the "Regulations," the first set of long-term population control regulations in Shaanxi. In response to Central Document No. 13's (May 1986) demands that localities formulate policies that are both acceptable to the people and effective in controlling the anticipated birth peak of the Seventh Five-Year Plan period ( 1986-90), 53 the Shaanxi Regulations increased the number of conditions under which second births were permitted while strengthening the organizational structure of birth planning work. The 1986 Regulations were still in effect in June 1988, when I left the research site.
Relations Between Provincial and Sub-provincial Regulations. The relations between regulations at provi ncia~ and sub-provincial levels challenge key assumptions of the top-down model. To begin with, the timing of policy modifications shows something other than a neat process of innovation flowing down the administrative hierarchy. The city's Supplementary Regulations introduced the mature one-child policy in March 1981, two months before it was adopted by the province. In 1979 the commune leapfrogged the city, and the brigade leapfrogged the commune, municipality and province in formulating birth rules.
Another departure from the assumptions of the top-down model can be seen in the response to the Central Committee's Document No. 7 ( 1984 ), whose guiding slogan was "open a small hole to close a large hole" (kai xiaokou du dakou). 54 The top-down model would lead one to expect a timely response by provincial policy-makers in the form of revised regulations. Instead, the response came a year later, it came on the municipal level, and it came in the form of a set of Opinions, a less formal and politically risky vehicle than regulations.
With regard to the content of documents at different levels, the regulations of the province and city were not deemed sufficient to guide birth planning work at lower levels. Accordingly, provincial and municipal regulations routinely ended with the stipulation that lowerlevel units were to draw up their own supplementary or detailed regulations that accorded with the spirit of the higher-level regulations but dealt adequately with the particular circumstances of the unit. The city's 1985 Opinions in effect apologized for making only gross inter-county and inter-district distinctions, and asked the counties and districts themselves to draw finer distinctions, differentiating among various kinds of policy targets so as to avoid "cutting with one stroke of the knife" (yi dao qie). Here is a case of intentional local autonomy, whereby lower units were explicitly authorized to exercise independence in devising birth regulations. In contrast to a totalitarian image of higher authorities dictating policy to lower officials, the evidence suggests the existence of a vigorous policy-making apparatus at the local level, one, moreover, that is approved of by higher levels.
Reproductive Rules
Matters of overarching importance, such as the reproductive demands made on the population, were treated only in documents issued by the provincial and municipal levels. As these matters form the heart of China's fertility policy, the degree and nature of change they have undergone provide key indicators of how the one-child policy has evolved. [children] ." By 1981 the slogan had changed to "late marriage, late childbearing, few births and eugenic births" (wanhun, wanyu, shaosheng, yousheng). Thus, while two requirements-late marriage and few births-remained unchanged, at the time the one-child policy was formally adopted the spacing of children was dropped as a basic demand (it became a condition for having a second child), and late childbearing and eugenic births were added to the list of basic requirements. The emphasis on late childbearing recognized the possibility of separating childbearing from marriage, an important objective, as the 1980 Marriage Law had reduced the effective minimum marriage age by stipulating a legal age at marriage (20 for women, 22 for men) that was lower than the age specified in the wanxishao regulations (in Shaanxi and most other places 23 and 25, respectively). The emphasis on eugenic births reflected the requirememts of the Marriage Law regarding physical qualifications for 
Basic

Opinions on Opening Small Hole (April 1985)
Urban Districts A, F, G, J and P-After failing to conceive for 5 years couple adopts child, tben wife becomes pregnant Q-Single children of martyrs R-One spouse has been underground miner for 5 or more years S-Remarried couple with one child or with two children, both of whom are offspring of same spouse, while other spouse is over 30 marrying. 55 All documents issued since 1981 have reiterated these four basic demands. The precise meaning of some of these demands underwent important shifts between 1979 and 1988. The definition of adequate spacing increased from "over three years" under the transitional policy to "at least four years" under the full-fledged one-child policy. Even more important, the meaning of "few births" changed between 1979, when couples were told that "one is best, don't exceed two," and 1981, when one was "encouraged" and second children were "strictly limited." Throughout the mature one-child policy period, third children were prohibited, in compliance with the policy established by the Open Letter.
Conditions for Second Children. While the emphasis of the policy since 1981 has remained the encouragement of families with only one child, the conditions for permitting second children have been gradually expanded. The process of policy evolution suggests a slow recognition of, and adaptation to, the differing constraints imposed on policy-makers by the urban and rural environments, differences that preceded, but certainly were exacerbated by the implementation of rural reforms in the early 1980s. The provincial regulations of 1981 and 1982 specified a uniform set of conditions for all parts of the province, while the regulations of 1986 differentiated between urban and rural areas. City policy-makers were more sensitive to contextual differences: although their 1981 regulations introduced a uniform set of conditions, by 1982 they had distinguished between rural and urban, and by 1985 they had differentiated four ecological zonesurban, irrigated, plains and mountainous districts-each with different sets of conditions for having second children. 56 As listed in Table 4 the conditions under which couples were permitted to have second children were steadily expanded over time. From five in 1981 the number of conditions specified by the province increased to seven in 1982 (six for urbanites), and 11 in 1986 (six for urban dwellers). At the city level the number of conditions rose from three in 1981 to six in 1982 (four for urbanites) to eight, 12, 14 or 16 in 1985, depending on ecological zone. While many of the conditions listed are likely to apply to very small numbers of couples, the most compelling reason for wanting a second .child -the first child is a girl-was added to the city's list in 1985 and to the province's in 1986. Constitutions and the 1980 Marriage Law, the birth planning regulations have consistently stated that all married couples must practice effective contraception. The type of contraception advocated, however, has been revised. The 1979 and 1981 regulations issued by the province spoke only of "methods fitting individual need" (yinren zhiyi) and "comprehensive methods of contraception" (zonghe jieyu cuoshi). 51 The municipal regulations of both 1982 and 1985 were more specific, advocating that, with some exceptions, women with one child should be fitted with an intrauterine device, while one member of couples with two or more children should be sterilized. The provincial regulations of 1986 also advocated IUD insertion after the first birth and sterilization after the second, but said further that one member of couples having three children must be sterilized. This latter requirement, which was largely implicit in earlier regulations, was part of a larger trade-off contained in the 1986 regulations: while more couples were allowed to have second children, more effective (indeed, irreversible) methods were used to eliminate third births. Finally, with regard to abortion, all the regulations stipulated that unauthorized pregnancies must be aborted early in the pregnancy (the Chinese phrase is "remedial measures" [bujiu cuoshi]). While the municipal regulations of 1982 authorized both firsttrimester and later abortions (liuchan, yinchan), after 1982 there was no reference to later than first-trimester abortions in any of the regulations, suggesting they were no longer condoned.
These changes in basic guidelines thus show not a "ribbon-candy pattern" of tightening-loosening-tightening, but rather a single oscillation, consisting of a hardening (of rules on spacing, number of children, and type of contraception) between 1979, when the transitional policy was introduced, and 1981-82, when the fullfledged one-child policy was adopted, followed by a softening (in increased conditions for second children and reduced acceptability of late abortions) between 1981-82 and 1988.
Enforcement among Individuals
Of the four basic demands made of couples under the one-child policy, one, few children, was backed by numerous measures, while two, late marriage and late childbearing, were enforced with a handful of means. The only other type of individual reproductive behaviour for which implementation measures were specified was birth control.
Enforcement of Late Marriage and Late Childbearing Rules.
Under the transitional policy in effect from l 979 to early 1981, late marriage -defined as 23 for women and 2 5 for men -was enforced 57. "Comprehensive methods" refers to a foll array of contraceptive methods, including pills, injectables, barrier methods, and so forth.
primarily by administrative means. The shift to the one-child policy brought a switch to economic incentives for marrying late. Specified by the provincial and municipal levels, these focused on the provision of extended, paid post-wedding holidays for couples in which both parties had reached the late marriage age. In the regulations of 1981 and 1982, among late-age couples marrying for the first time, if the wife was 23 they could enjoy seven extra days' holiday, if 24, 17 days, and if 25 or older, 27 days. In 1986 these holiday period were extended by three days.
The promise of lengthier holidays might have been attractive to urban, state-sector couples, whose wages would be paid by their work units during their leave of absence, or to the tiny minority of rural couples in production teams still practising unified distribution (whose workpoints would be recorded during their leave). However, lengthier paid holidays provided no incentive to marry late among rural couples in teams that had introduced responsibility systems, which, we have seen, comprised the vast majority from 1982 on. Unlike the incentives for late childbearing and acceptance of onechild certificates, however, the inducements to marry late were not revised to fit the changed rural environment. That they were simply left in their original form suggests that by l 981-82 policy-makers had virtually given up on encouraging rural couples to marry late. Not only had the 1980 Marriage Law made it legal to marry three years earlier than the late marriage age, but the responsibility system introduced in 1980 provided strong incentives for families to marry their sons early to increase the size of the labour force available to cultivate newly acquired plots. Thus, the implementation of the economic reforms, in the context of a lowered legal age at marriage, may have forced policy-makers to largely abandon an important policy goal in the countryside.
From 1981, when late childbearing (defined as "over age 24") was first advocated in the regulations, to 1988, the provincial regulations offered the same incentives for compliance with the rules. Both the Temporary Regulations of 1981 and the Regulations of 1986 promised those delaying childbearing until after the age of24 a 70-day paid maternity leave. In contrast to the province, city-level measures were adjusted to fit the changed rural context. The city's Detailed Regulations of May 1982 stipulated that in areas implementing responsibility systems, instead of paid leaves, women giving birth late were to be awarded subsidies equivalent to at least 70 per cent of those issued to team cadres.
Implementation of Rules on Birth Control.
From the time rules on birth limitation were first formulated, couples were compensated for the time lost during convalescence and materially rewarded for undergoing birth control operations (i.e., IUD insertion, abortion and sterilization). These economic incentives were substantial in 1979, but they declined considerably over time.
The provincial regulations adopted in 1979 stipulated paid rest periods of varying durations for those undergoing each of the birth limitation operations. In addition to having their wages paid or workpoints recorded, those being sterlized were to receive a nutrition subsidy of 15 yuan and a cash reward of 50 yuan (for those with one child) or 30 yuan (for those with two children). They were also to receive fixed amounts of meat, eggs, sugar and refined grain. Regulations devised by the commune in the same year added a major innovation: a large benefit of 56 days of recorded workpoints for women having an IUD inserted after their first birth. Throughout the period studied, the commune was the only administrative level offering material inducements for IUD insertion, suggesting a certain degree of autonomy enjoyed by policy-makers at that level.
Presumably because work units found it too expensive to maintain, this generous system of incentives for undergoing surgery was gradually dismantled. The temporal correspondence between the reduction of these incentives and the introduction of the agricultural responsibility system suggests that a leading proximate cause of the decline in incentives was the sharp fall in the size of the welfare fund (gongyi jin), which declined drastically after the abolition of collective accounting. In 1981 the city abolished the sterilization rewards of 50 and 30 yuan, while the province reduced the nutrition fee from 15 to l 0 yuan. The dietary supplements disappeared from the regulations in the same year.
Implementation of Rules on Number of Children.
By far the greatest amount of space in the regulations was devoted to the benefits proffered to couples signing "single-child certificates" and the penalties exacted from those having unauthorized births.
Single-child benefits were specified by aJJ levels of government, with lower levels generally elaborating on the provisions of higher levels, and sometimes going beyond them to devise new kinds of incentives. In order to see how the benefits have changed over time, it is useful to concentrate on the province-level regulations, which span the full decade 1979-88.
Analysis of these regulations shows a clear decline in the benefits offered single-child certificate holders over time. Table 5 displays these changes in benefits for urban and rural only children separately. In the urban areas a wide range of benefits eroded over time: by 1986 the double allotment of housing space offered in 1979 and 1981 bad been changed to priority in the allocation of housing; the additional ounce of edible oil per month had been halved; priority for hospital admittance had disappeared from the list of benefits; and the 5 per cent increase in retirement pensions for parents of single children had been eliminated. In addition, the number of years the health fees and oil rations were to be received had shrunk from 16 in 1979 to 14 in 1981 and 1986. Doubtless because of the smaller resource base of rural units, the benefits offered peasants have consistently been less generous than those proffered urbanites. Yet even these meagre benefit levels sank over time. The 1979 and 1981 regulations offered single-child families priority consideration in the recruitment of peasants to work in collective sideline enterprises or urban industry, pursue advanced studies or join the army. However, as collective enterprises increasingly were contracted out to individuals, and schooling and military service opportunities grew scarcer, these benefits were phased out. Probably the most attractive benefits offered-adult grain rations (1979 and 1981) and special consideration in the distribution of refined grain, sideline products, and other material goods ( 1979 only)-were eliminated with the dissolution of the collective distribution system in the early 1980s. The 1982 Supplementary Regulations attempted to cope with these changes in the rural economic environment by allowing local cadres a choice of substitute benefits; by 1986 this major economic benefit had disappeared entirely from the regulations.
In the rural areas the benefits for single children declined not only in absolute size, but also in relative attractiveness to parents. With the parcelling out of collective land, opportunities to grow wealthy through farming and diversification into village-based sidelines multiplied, making the prospect of earning wages as a worker or soldier outside the village less appealing than it was during the collective era. Even the offer of an advanced education apparently declined in attractiveness, as peasants seeking short-term profits removed pupils at all levels from school to work on the family plot. 58 In the urban areas, where penalties were relatively easy to collect, the fines for having unauthorized second, third or higher-order children climbed in the 1980s (see Table 6 ). In the provincial regulations the rise in fines was particularly steep between 1982 and 1986, when the excess-child fee for third births doubled to 20 per cent of both spouses' wages for 14 years.
Penalties applying to rural couples changed dramatically over time, as decollectivization weakened cadres' control over peasant life, forcing policy-makers to devise new means to prevent unauthorized births. In 1979 and 1981 unplanned reproduction was discouraged by such means as direct deductions from peasants' income, the calculation of grain rations at unfavourable prices, and the exclusion of birth planning violators from distributions of private plots and housing land. With the dismantling of the collective distribution system, however, these means of enforcement were no longer available. Apparently recognizing this constraint posed by the rural economic reforms, designers of the 1982 Supplementary Regulations abolished 58 . In Xianyang parents began in the early 1980s to remove their daughters from school after the fifth or sixth grade. Teachers in the local school system estimate that the proportion of primary school graduates going on to junior middle school had dropped from almost 100% in the late 1970s to 50-90%, depending on the village, by 1988. all penalties except the excess-child fine, and specified a variety of means by which cadres could collect the :fine. However, when land contracts were extended to 15 years in 1984, some of the most effective means of extracting penalties were eliminated. The 1986 regulations reflected this lack of options, stipulating the payment of cash fines, but no means of collection. The economic reforms reduced the efficacy of birth planning penalties not only by narrowing the range of punishments that could be meted out, but also by increasing peasant incomes, thus reducing the impact of the fines on peasant living standards. Like cultivators elsewhere in China, peasants in Shaanxi thought nothing of paying fines of several hundred yuan for the privilege of having more than one child. 59
• Taken together, the changes documented above reveal the profoundly disruptive effects of the rural economic reforms on the onechild policy in Shaanxi. As the economic reforms strengthened peasants' desire and ability to contravene the regulations, and weakened cadres' ability to enforce them, rural enforcement mechanisms were not tightened, loosened and tightened. Rather, they were steadily dismantled. The benefits for single children and birth control surgery declined both in size and in attractiveness, while incentives for late marriage were effectively abolished. Penalties too became less effective, narrowing in scope and falling as a proportion of peasant income. By 1986 the rural enforcement structure was weakened to the point that there were few carrots or sticks left to induce peasants to comply.
Enforcement among Cadres
Without the co-operation of cadres and Party members, even the most well-conceived system of individual incentives would fail to produce reproductive change. In the Shaanxi regulations, specification of cadres' responsibilities for birth planning followed close on the heels of the rural reforms, which, as noted, turned rural cadres into part-time peasants with little incentive to enforce birth control among fellow villagers. At the provincial level only one item in the 1979 Trial Regulations dealt with the birth planning duties of cadres and government departments. The Temporary Regulations of 1981 allocated two items to such responsibilities, while the Regulations of 1986 devoted an entire chapter to these matters.
The Cadre Network and its Duties. Instructions on the establishment of a cadre network were contained in the city's Detailed Regulations of 1982. The most important duties of birth planning cadres, stipulated in the provincial regulations of 1979, 1981 and 1986, were to devise long-term population plans and yearly (or 59. Based on co untless conversations with peasants in Xianyang. periodic) birth plans, and to ensure that birth quotas were not exceeded by administering the economic and disciplinary measures stipulated in the regulations. As individuals, cadres and Party members were enjoined to serve as birth planning models, taking the lead in practising late marriage, effective contraception and planned childbearing.
IIli the provincial Regulations of 1986 the number of government departments with concrete responsibilities for birth planning work was greatly expanded. This broadening of the responsibilities for population control was yet another response to the rural economic reforms, whose pro-natalist consequences birth planning workers alone were unable to stem.
Rewards and Penalties for Cadres. The regulations contained both carrots and sticks to induce cadres to co-operate. Between 1979 and 1986 the positive inducements to comply underwent little change. For urban work and medical units and individuals achieving "outstanding" results in birth planning, both provincial and municipal regulations offered citations, priority in consideration for model and "advanced" status, and material rewards.
While cadres were rewarded only for good professional performance, they were punished both for poor performance of their duties and for neglect of birth planning in their personal Ii ves-failing to "take the lead" in fertility control. Beginning in 1981, the first year the regulations embodied the full-fledged one-child policy, the emphasis shifted from penalizing cadres for not planning their own childbearing to punishing them for failing to fulfil their units' population plans. The last mention of punishment for excess childbearing occurred in the provincial Temporary Regulations ( 1982). The conclusion that punishments for cadres having excess births fell off after around 1982 is strengthened by a set of commune-level documents dated 1979-82 detailing the loss of their posts by commune cadres, teachers, women's team heads and other officials, 28 in all, who violated the birth planning rules. Significantly, no such documents were found for any year after 1982. The most plausible explanation for the decline in this form of punishment is not that policy-makers became unconcerned about cadres who violated the rules in their personal lives, but that they were increasingly constrained from relieving violators of their posts by the decline in interest in holding cadre positions that had followed decollectivization and commune reform. Had birth planning violators all been removed from their posts, there might have been no one left to carry out the policy! For cadres not fulfilling their units' population plans, the city's Detailed Regulations of 1982 and the provincial Regulations of 1986 warned of economic penalties or disciplinary action, according to the circumstances of the case. Terms such as "economic penalties" and "disciplinary action" are somewhat vague, making it difficult to determine whether the penalties for cadres grew more or less severe over time. The only information bearing directly on this question comes from the commune regulations of June 1981 and January 1983. The earlier regulations stipulated a 20 per cent reduction in the workpoints of cadres not implementing the policy; in the later rules the fine had dropped to 10 per cent of their income.
Trends in enforcement among cadres thus reinforce our earlier conclusion about the profound impact of the rural economic reforms on population policy. It was the effect of decollectivization on the role of local cadres that necessitated both the establishment of a network of birth planning workers and the later expansion of the number of departments and groups with responsibility for population control. Another intriguing possibility is that the reforms forced policy-makers to reduce the penalties for cadres having unauthorized children, to avoid a massive depletion of cadre ranks. Overall, then, the evidence lends little support to the oscillatory view, showing instead a steady decline in penalties for unauthorized births among cadres since the introduction of the full-fledged one-child policy, and, although our data are limited, probably a decline also in penalties for cadres failing to fulfil their units' targets.
Centre and Locality, Continuity and Change in Shaanxi's Birth Planning Policy
What can the Shaanxi materials tell us about population policy generally? In this conclusion I draw together the findings on the degree of local autonomy, the impact of socio-economic reform, and the relative weight of cyclical and linear trends.
Local Autonomy versus Central Control. Our analysis suggests that localities have a significant measure of autonomy in deciding on the contents and timing of innovations in local population policy. This finding challenges a key assertion of the cycles-of-coercion model, that policy-making power is concentrated in Beijing. With regard to content, overarching matters such as basic reproductive demands were the exclusive domain of provincial and municipal documents. However, lower levels were given a great deal of freedom to specify methods of enforcement, both economic and administrative, and directed to both individuals and cadres. With explicit authorization from the province and city, lower levels both elaborated on enforcement methods established by higher authorities and introduced novel techniques not found in higher-level regulations.
The timing of policy modifications suggests the possibility of a second power held by localities, the ability to resist and delay. Shaanxi formally adopted the one-child rule only in 19 81 , nearly two years after it was advocated by the political centre. The city incorporated the essentials of the province's May 1981 Temporary Regulations only in May 1982, and those of the Central Committee's Document No. 7 of April 1984 only in April 1985. Three possible interpretations of these time lags exist. First, they could indicate routine bureaucratic delays, the time it normally takes new policies to work their way down the administrative hierarchy. Other policies, however, took only two months. to move from the province to the commune, suggesting that this explanation is inadequate. A second possibility is that the delays were dictated by higher political levels. For example, in late 1979 the central leadership might have ordered less developed provinces such as Shaanxi to wait until the one-child policy was tested in other areas before formally adopting it.
The third and most intriguing possibility is that provincial and municipal leaders resisted and successfully retarded the introduction of policies they believed would be difficult to enforce. The probability that policy-makers in Shaanxi deliberately delayed introducing this difficult policy is reinforced by the province's late and indecisive reaction to Central Document No. 7. Rather than issue new rules that followed the more liberal line of Document 7, decision makers in Shaanxi delayed responding (presumably waiting to see whether the Document would be reversed). The response, which came a year later, was a set of Opinions issued not by the province but by the city. Opinions are a convenient tool for risk-averse policy-makers because their relationship to official policy is inherently ambiguous, and they can be implemented or overlooked, as circumstances dictate.
Finally, the process of policy innovation resembled not a neat pattern of policy decisions trickling, level by level, down the administrative hierarchy, but an uneven pattern in which lower levels sometimes leapfrogged their immediate "superiors," adopting policies promoted by higher levels of the political system. At the commune level, where fertility control documents were particularly diverse, the impetus for policy innovation came not from the city, but from implementation problems arising within the commune itself. Rather than simply duplicate provincial regulations, sub-provincial units investigated the enforcemeQt situation within their borders, inviting the heads of subordinate units to help devise regulations appropriate to local realities. In contrast to the totalitarian image of higher authorities dictating policy to lower officials, the evidence suggests the existence of a vigorous and relatively autonomous policy-making apparatus at the local level, one, moreover, that is approved by higher levels.
Effects of Rural Reforms: Superficial versus Fundamental Policy Change
The Shaanxi birth planning regulations lend little support to the view that the impact of the rural reforms was superficial, easily countered by minor innovations in enforcement techniques. On the contrary, decollectivization forced major modifications in both the rules and the enforcement of birth planning. The rules on eligibility for second children were steadily liberalized, so that by 1986 rural Shaanxi couples whose first child was a girl could have another. Methods of enforcement changed more strikingly still. The most important change by far was a drastic decline in the size of the benefits offered rural couples having only one child and undergoing contraceptive surgery. These rewards declined not only in amount, but also in attractiveness, as rising incomes shrank their relative value. Incentives for delaying marriage were effectively abandoned, as the economic inducements to marry early, coupled with the early legal age at marriage, apparently put this goal beyond the reach of Shaanxi policy-makers. Rural cadres' ability to enforce penalties was also gravely damaged by the abolition of team accounting. When cadres lost control over peasant income, they largely lost their ability to collect birth planning fines.
Decollectivization necessitated the creation of a network of birth planning cadres in 1981 and the involvement of other government departments in 1986. Yet even as these networks were being formed, higher authorities were losing their control over grassroots cadres. Material rewards shrank in relative value, while punishments fell in absolute size. Overall, then, the reforms had devastating effects on the one-child policy, watering down its content and undermining the mechanisms by which it was to be enforced.
Cyclical versus Linear Change. In contrast to the oscillatory view, the above analysis suggests that learning about the relationship between the means and ends of fertility policy has occurred. The lessons, however, have not been positive ones that would allow policymakers to introduce the requisite means to achieve their fertility reduction ends. What have been learned, rather, are negative lessons in what does not work. A broad range of evidence from Shaanxi suggests that experience has taught policy-makers that normative means are of limited use, economic incentives are increasingly unavailable, and coercive measures work in the short run, but backfire, producing both passive and active resistance that damages prospects for success in the long run. The message, in short, is that in the current rural environment there are no effective means to achieve the original goal of rapid fertility decline to below replacement levels. This leaves policy-makers with little choice but to change ther goals. And this is precisely what they did. Beginning in 1982 the reproductive rules were liberalized to allow an increasing number of couples to have second children. The population size target was also revised. In 1 985 the central leadership changed the national target for the year 2000 from 1·2 billion to about 1·2 billion, generally interpreted as 1·25 billion. The Shaanxi target was revised accordingly, from 34· 5 million to 35·5 million. 60 Thus, as early as 1982 policy-makers began 60 . That this additional l million represents Shaanxi's share of the 50 million by which the national target was increased (the difference between l ·2 and l ·25 billion) is suggested by the fact that l million is 2% of the total increase, and Shaanxi's population is 2·86% of the current total population. This is the amount by which one would expect leaders to increase Shaanxi's allocation if target increases were allocated to provinces according, to their population sizes. See Nan Gu and Ke Mei, "Shaanxi implements responsibility system in population control," Shaanxi ribao ( slouching towards the recognition that fertility reduction can be treated as an order goal only at great peril. Modifications of goals and methods made in subsequent years suggest the realization, doubtless implicit, that fertility reduction is best framed as an economic-ideological goal, to be achieved indirectly, by altering the socio-economic and ideational environment.
After the introduction of the mature one-child policy in 1981, the overall direction of policy change was not cyclical but linear, a finding that challenges the basic tenet of the oscillatory model. (If the transitional period is included, policy change resembles a U, with the policy becoming more restrictive between 1979 and the early 1980s, followed by a relaxation.) Not only has there been a relaxation of goals since the early 1980s, but there is evidence of progressive, though still limited, liberalization in the rules on second children, and steady weakening of the mechanisms for enforcing the rules. This is not to say that there is anything like reproductive freedom in China. The policy remains highly restrictive; indeed, the practice of contraception is a legal obligation in that country. The argument, rather, is that wheels have been set in motion that are moving the system towards allowing-or conceding-greater reproductive freedom to individual peasants. How far the system will move in this direction is impossible to say; however, the answer is apt to hinge on the fate of the rural economic reforms, whose continuation in some form is likely, despite the political repression and economic retrenchment of the late 1980s.
This analysis suggests that the ends and means of the one-child policy have changed not because China's or Shaanxi's leaders wanted to reduce their control over peasant fertility. They changed rather because the reforms fundamentally altered the rural context of policy formulation and implementation, undermining the ability of the centre to impose its demographic wishes on the hinterland.
Future Scenarios. A trend towards liberalization does not means that political campaigns and high tides will cease to occur. Indeed, leaders may be more tempted to resort to mobilization means now than in the past, as economic measures become less and less effective in controlling rural births. Indeed, both field evidence from Shaanxi and articles in the national media indicate a resurgence of campaigns in 1986-88 after a hiatus in 1984-85. 61 In interpreting the evidence on mobilization .
• however, it must be recognized that profound changes have occurred in the campaigns themselves since the early 1980s. Put simply, the "hard" peaks of policy are much softer today than they were a decade ago. This is because campaigns have been subject to the same diluting forces that watered down the regulations. The reforms not only deprived campaign planners of reliable local cadres and viable economic sanctions, they also undermined the financial capability of localities to undertake major campaigns, which require massive financial outlays. 62 In one Shaanxi prefecture the funds for birth planning declined to the point that even routine work was threatened. 63 Thus, provincial leaders may have set campaigns in motion in 1986-88, but they could not guarantee their success.
Whether the leadership will attempt to tum the weakened campaign structure into a more coercive one iis another question. While it certainly has the capacity to do so, the lesson from the massive sterilization campaign of 1983 is that the political costs of such a move-peasant backlash, cadre disillusionment-are extremely high. Violence against rural cadres has seen a resurgence in the reform era, threatening cherished political stability in the countryside. 64 As much of this violence has been directed towards birth planning workers., 65 and focused on issues of family continuity and solidarity 66 -precisely what is threatened by the birth limitation programmeviolence against birth planning workers is likely to intensify, not decline. The political costs of raising the level of coercion may thus not be worth incurring, in particular, as campaigns provide only short-term solutions to a problem requiring sustained, long-term work.
The direction of learning so far suggests that a more likely scenario is further modification of the policy's goals. As achievement of the national target of l · 25 billion becomes increasingly improbable, policy-makers may be tempted to revise it upward to avoid an embarrassingly large gap between articulated goals and achieved outcomes. The growing influence of demographers, including foreigntrained specialists, on population policy formulation makes this outcome all the more likely. 67 Since the heady days of 1979-83, when top policy-makers apparently thought any demographic goal was achievable, demographers have injected a strong dose of reality into the policy-making process. Demographers' assessments of the detrimental social consequences of the one-child rule, 68 measurements of extensive under-reporting of births, 69 and projections of substantial population growth well into the future 70 make the point that in order to produce a sustained fertility decline, one that, moreover, does not tear the social and political fabric, fertility must be coaxed, rather than coerced, down.
